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F E AT U R E

The CIA on Canadian Defence
Policy
J. L . G R A NAT S T E I N
Abstract : At the request of the Pentagon, in the spring of 1985 the Central
Intelligence Agency prepared an assessment of Canadian defence policy.
Brian Mulroney’s Progressive Conservatives had formed the government
in the election of 4 September 1984 and, in the CIA’s view, the new
administration was likely to be more interested in defence than the
Liberals. Even so, the assessment observed that “Canadians generally
think little about defense and when they do, reject outright the idea of
giving defense priority over maintaining the social welfare system.”

I

1985, Brian Mulroney’s Progressive Conservative
government had been in office for eight months since sweeping the
September 1984 federal election. The Tories had complained long and
loud about the defence policy of Pierre Trudeau’s Liberal government,
and they had pledged to spend more on the Canadian Forces and to
restore somewhat frayed relations with the Reagan administration in
Washington and with NATO.
In the spring of 1985, the J5—the Strategic Plans and Policy
section—of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff requested that the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) prepare an assessment of Canadian defence
policy, and the Agency’s Office of European Analysis took on the task.
The Office was headed by John McLaughlin, a very able CIA officer
since 1972 who had just completed a stint in the Department of State’s
Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs and who would rise in
2004 to be Acting Director of the CIA. McLaughlin’s staff wrote the
report, but the Office head, with his experience of Canadian policy
gained at State, almost certainly would have included his views.
n
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The report’s analysis was harshly critical of Trudeau’s defence
policy and, indeed, his utter lack of interest in military matters.
The CIA analysts were much more hopeful about the Mulroney
government’s defence plans, and there were high hopes for Erik
Nielsen, the Deputy Prime Minister and the new Minister of
National Defence, a post he took after the resignation of Robert
Coates on 12 February 1985. Coates had been forced to resign after
news of a visit to a strip club frequented by prostitutes in Lahr,
Germany came to light. But Nielsen was busy carrying out the Prime
Minister’s assignment that he look across the whole of government for
programmes to cut, and there was some concern that he might be too
busy to pay much attention to his portfolio. There was somewhat less
hope for Joe Clark, the Secretary of State for External Affairs who,
while as supportive of NATO as the Ottawa bureaucracy, was deemed
to be “an almost prototypical representative of the internationalism
that permeates postwar Canadian attitudes to foreign and defense
policy.” That comment was not intended as a compliment. Nor was
the Agency’s assessment of Canadian public opinion: “Canadians
generally think little about defense and when they do, reject outright
the idea of giving defense priority over maintaining the social welfare
system.” It would be hard to disagree with that comment at any time
in the years since 1945.
The analysis ended with attempts to forecast where Canadian
policy might go in the near future. There would be, the CIA analysts
suggested, more emphasis on NATO with an increased army
commitment, the possible withdrawal of the Air Force’s interceptors
in Europe, and more attention to northern defence. While there was
a small increase in troop strength in Germany, these predictions did
not come to pass. Nonetheless, this was a generally impressive and
cool-headed assessment of the Trudeau government’s defence failings
and the prospects for improvements under the Tory regime.
This document, Number CIA-RDP85T01058R000202840001-0,
was declassified on 2 November 2009, and has few, seemingly minor
excisions on security grounds. It is available online at foia.cia.gov.
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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
The Politics of Canadian Defence
9 May 1985

summary
Canada’s military capabilities declined as a result of 16 years of
neglect by the government of Liberal Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau.
Prime Minister Mulroney’s Conservatives have begun to rectify
these deficiencies but in doing so have caused a storm of controversy.
The relatively small political opposition has taken
advantage of this vagueness and has succeeded [sic] in confusing the
defense issue—by connecting SDI with the new US-Canada North
Warning System, for example—and in creating a public perception
that the Tories are focusing on defence in order to curry favor with
Washington. Nevertheless, we believe that Mulroney will continue
trying to improve Canada’s defense effort—particularly its NATO
component—and will do so within the limitations imposed by a
budgetdeficit that, as a percentage of GNP, is larger than that of the
United States. We also believe that Ottawa is eager to reshape and
curtail the country’s NATO tasks to more nearly match Canada’s
desires and available resources.

trudeau and defense: a case of neglect
During Liberal Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s tenure—1968-1984—
Ottawa devoted little attention and minimal resources to defense.
Between 1968 and 1977, for example, Trudeau showed, according
to a noted Canadian historian, an almost malevolent attitude
toward the Canadian Forces (CF) and, in effect, starved them with
This memorandum was requested by Major Frank McHugh, USAF, J-5, JCS and
was prepared by
/EURA/WE/BBC. Please refer any questions to
John McLaughlin, C/EUEA/WE
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parsimonious budgets. During this period, Trudeau established
home defense, or “sovereignty protection,” as the CF’s primary
task and consistently played down Canada’s military contribution
to NATO; in the early 1970s, for example, Ottawa withdrew half
of its forces from West Germany. In the late 1970s, however, the
Liberal government began—in the face of strong pressure from its
NATO allies—to appropriate more funds for defense, particularly for
the replacement of aging equipment. The current Canadian Frigate
Program (CFP) and the on-going purchase of CF-18 fighters are the
major replacement programs.
In our view, Trudeau’s deliberate neglect of the armed forces
was facilitated by negative or ambivalent Canadian attitudes toward
defense. First, Trudeau himself was profoundly anti-military and saw
little merit in defense spending when the funds could be used to
address social problems. Second, and more importantly, Canadian
society is to a great extent ambivalent toward the military, and
generally considers only the the [sic] enforcement of sovereignty
regulations and international peacekeepinq duties as the proper tasks
of the CF. Since 1945, for example, with the near-universal approval
of the Canadian public, Ottawa has aided UN peacekeeping activities
in Cyprus, the Suez Canal Zone, and the Golan Heights. Likewise,
once Trudeau formally established sovereignty protection as the CF’s
major task in a White Paper in 1971—even though he introduced few
measures to assist the Forces in performing such a task—the public
quickly approved and supported this role. Both these tasks detracted
from the importance the public attached to Canada’s NATO role, and
thereby allowed Trudeau’s neglect of the capabilities of the armed
forces to pass virtually unnoticed—except for some Tories, military
analysts, and the NATO allies.
Also contributing to Trudeau’s ability to run down the Canadian
military was the Canadian public’s general lack of a perception that
the country is threatened militarily. US commentators often contend
that Canadians historically have been content to take a “free ride”
on defense, first allowing Great Britian [sic] to carry the burden and,
since 1945, allowing the United States to carry it. We believe that
this sort of analysis gives Canadians too much credit for consciously
thinking about their country’s defense needs. In our opinion,
Canadians generally think little about defense and when they do,
reject outright the idea of giving defense priority over maintaining

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol29/iss1/14

4

Granatstein: The CIA on Canadian Defence Policy
G R A N AT S T E I N

5

the social welfare system. These attitudes made it easy for Trudeau
to ignore defense, and will make it very difficult for Mulroney to
implement a more expensive and efficient defense program. We believe
that an aggressive government-sponsored “education” program for the
public—that emphasizes the existence of an external threat and the
possible economic benefits of improving the CF’s capabilities—would
have to be undertaken before Ottawa could push major increments in
Canadian spending, no matter which party is in power.

tory defense policy: reality replaces rhetoric
The Conservative Party’s policy pronouncements in 1983 and 1984
often focused on the Liberals’ defense record, criticizing the sorry
state of the Canadian Forces and promising to provide sufficient
“first-class equipment” to allow them to perform their varied missions.
In passionate speeches, Mulroney damned Trudeau’s neglect of the
military, evasion of Canada’s NATO responsibilities, and failure to
protect Canada’s territorial integrity. The Tories promised 6-percent
real growth in defense spending, significant increases in both regular
and reserve manpower, and the acquisition of an ability to protect
Canadian interests off each of the country’s three oceanic coasts.
After winning a massive victory in September, 1984, however,
Mulroney and his colleagues quickly discovered that they had
inherited an economic mess from the liberals—including a deficit
($27 billion) larger as a percentage of GNP than that of the United
States—that precluded them from fulfilling their defense pledges.
Indeed, one of the Tories first acts was to cut $154 million from the
defense budget—supposedly an adjustment for lower than expected
inflation. More recently, Ottawa permitted to expire an option to buy
20 additional CF-18 fighters at the same cost as an earlier group,
and has failed to place the follow-on order for more ships under the
Canadian Frigate Program. In our opinion, these actions are evidence
neither of Tory insincerity nor duplicitity [sic] on defense—indeed,
we believe the Tories are intent on modernizing and moderately
expanding Canada’s defense capabilities—but are rather the result of
severe budgetary constraints.
Mulroney also faces a lack of Cabinet and party consensus on
the direction Canadian defense spending should take. Many Tory
MPs see little point in increasing defense spending if it does not bring
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the party tangible political benefits. This group—which probably
is dominant among backbenchers and which is looked on with
sympathy, if not fully supported, by Mulroney and Defense Minister
Erik Nielsen—favors spending to maintain or expand the defense
establishment in Canada, and with it those communities located near
military bases. Sovereignty protection and/or continental defense,
therefore, appeals most to this faction. Another group, led by External
Affairs Minister Joe Clark and Disarmament Ambassador Douglas
Roche, appears to favor spending that stresses the improvement of
Canada’s contribution to NATO. According to their public speeches,
both men see the upgrading of the West’s conventional forces as a
means of raising the nuclear threshold [sic], and, more importantly,
believe that a bigger Canadian contribution would expand Ottawa’s
political clout in the Alliance. Finally, Mulroney inherited a number
of defense hardliners in his parliamentary caucus – including former
Defense Minister Robert Coates and several longtime MPs from
the western provinces—who favor increasing defense spending to a
degree sufficient to permit the CF to execute all existing tasks. This
group is highly vocal and will press the Cabinet for action. Moreover,
it may serve Mulroney as a tool with which to prod his less defenseminded colleagues to agree to military improvements simply to quiet
the rightwing [sic] and thereby forestall public sniping from the group
that might damage the government and party.

the defense debate: key players and pressure groups
The key Tory defense players are Mulroney, Clark, and Nielsen.
Following are their basic positions:
Mulroney - Mulroney appears to view the world almost exclusively
through an East-West prism that places priority on Canada’s
commitments to NATO and NORAD. If he could have his own
way, we believe that Mulroney would expand each contribution
qualitatively. and quantitatively[.] That said, however, Mulroney
is first and foremost a shrewd politician determined to make the
Tories into Canada’s “natural” governing party—as the Liberals
were for most of this century. To this end, we believe he will pursue
a defense policy that most of his party can support, and that will
serve the party’s political interests by bringing economic benefit to

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol29/iss1/14

6

Granatstein: The CIA on Canadian Defence Policy
G R A N AT S T E I N

7

the country. In the overall defense debate, we believe that Mulroney
will insist on at least minimal improvements in Canada’s NATO and
NORAD contributions—he clearly believes this is necessary to keep
his number-one foreign policy goal of better Canada-US relations on
track. Beyond that, he will seek a cabinet, party, and public defense
consensus. The disadvantage to Mulroney’s step-by-step approach
is that it is time consuming and therefore makes rapid substantive
improvement or new departures unlikely. The advantage is that it
may enable Mulroney to install a durable defense policy that more
nearly matches current resources and desires to the country’s NATO,
NORAD, and home defense commitments.
Clark - Clark is an almost prototypical representative of the
internationalism that permeates postwar Canadian attitudes toward
foreign and defense policy; he is, in fact, much closer philosophically
to traditional Liberal party policy than is either Mulroney or
Nielsen. Nonetheless, Clark, according to his public speeches,
believes that Trudeau went too far in backing away from close
relations with Washington and NATO, and in ignoring the needs
of Canada’s military forces. It now appears that Clark will try to
enhance Canada’s political influence in NATO—he probably places
slightly more importance on Canada’s multilateral commitments
than does Mulroney or Nielsen—and regards an improved Canadian
contribution to the Alliance as a key means to that end. In our
opinion, Clark is likely to try to push the Cabinet toward an increase
in Canada’s commitment to NATO, and probably would welcome
encouragement from the other allies to buttress his position. We
also believe that Clark will attempt to use the Canadian public’s
traditional affinity for NATO to stymie the party’s hardliners and
home defense advocates by arguing that Tory support for NATO
may be the most politically palatable way to increase Canadian
defense spending at a time of budgetary restraint.
Nielsen - Nielsen is a veteran Tory parliamentarian and a muchdecorated World War II pilot. He reportedly was delighted to have
the defense portfolio added to the one he holds as Deputy Prime
Minister. During the Tories’ opposition years, Nielsen was the party’s
most outspoken critic of Liberal defense policy; he now finds himself,
however, with the power but not the funding to improve Canada’s
defense effort significantly. Although vociferously pro-NATO,
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Nielsen has hinted that he is also concerned with addressing home
and continental defense issues. He was, for example, the leading
proponent of an early conclusion of the Canada-US North Warning
System (NWS) Agreement. Like Mulroney, however, Nielsen’s main
concern is keeping the Tories in power, and he therefore probably
will agree to make Canada’s NATO commitments his Department’s
top priority on the grounds that it is the most politically expedient
defense option. Moreover, Nielsen currently is charged with
reviewing well over 1,000 federal spending programs with an eye
toward reducing the deficit through program elimination. Nielsen
has said that his preliminary report will not be ready before the end
of November. Because Nielsen’s review is the Tories’ major deficit
cutting effort, it seems likely that the Defense Minister will have
little time for his defense portfolio until well into 1986. For that
reason, we expect that the Canadian military’s NATO orientation
probably will remain undisturbed.
The oppostion [sic] parties—the Liberals and the New Democrats
(NDP) – and the media are making the development of Tory defense
policy a frustrating, acrimonious, and time-consuming affair. Because
the Tories’ parliamentary opposition consists of little more than a
tattered rump—40 Liberals and 30 New Democrats in a 282-member
Parliament—it must necessarily focus on issues that will win it
media attention and will strike most deeply at public sensitivities
and paranoias. Since Parliament convened last September, the
opposition has fixed its attacks largely on defense-related issues, and
has demonstrated an ability to unnerve and enfeeble the government,
arouse the media, and worry the public. The opposition portrayed,
for example, the modernization of the Distant Early Warning
radar system—now the North Warning System—as part of the US
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The result of this tactic has been
an on-going, sulphurous parliamentary debate that apparently has
convinced much of the public and media that such a connection
exists and that the Tories are bending to US wishes. Likewise, the
government’s decision to dispatch 1,200 additional troops to West
Germany is being characterized widely by the press and opposition
as a move aimed more at pleasing Washington than improving
Canada’s NATO contribution. In large measure, Mulroney caused
much of the latter problem by announcing the decision just before
meeting President Reagan at Quebec City in March.
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The opposition’s attacks are aided and made more effective by
most of the Canadian media. The media tend to treat the United
States and the Soviet Union as equals in regard to military matters,
and describe various actions by Washington and Moscow in similar
unflattering terms. The media also exude pride in the fact that
Canada has no nuclear weapons on its soil or in the CF’s control,
and manifest particular delight in lecturing the superpowers on the
issues of disarmament and arms control. Thus when the opposition
is able to link, even tangentially, a government defense or foreign
policy to nuclear weapons—the NDP’s attacks against the Liberals’
decision to allow the testing of US cruise missiles in Canada, and
the current attacks on the supposed link between the NWS and SDI
are two prime examples—the media hop aboard and sound a clarion
call for the protection of Canada’s supposed nuclear virginity. In
our view, the consistent success of the opposition and media in
gaining the public’s attention via tenuous claims and allegations is
evidence both of the unsophisticated nature of the defense debate in
Canada, and the almost universal failure of the general populace,
most of the media and many politicians to perceive the existence of
an external threat.
According to senior officials in both the Department of External
Affairs (DEA) and the Department of National Defense (DND),
government opinion sampling in 1984 showed that the Tories’
campaign for a thorough reexamination of defense policy caught
the public’s interest. The poll results showed that the public favored
the development of a defense policy designed to match Canadian
tasks with the available resources. In our opinion however, the Tories
wasted this opportunity—
—and now
have little room to maneuver. Mulroney moved so quickly to establish
better ties with the United States that he has left the Tories open
to charges of toadyism whenever they strike an attitude or adopt a
policy even roughly similar to Washington’s. Mulroney’s haste to
dispatch new troops to Europe and to complete the NWS Agreement
for signing at the Quebec Summit contributed to the public’s growing
perception of him as a US pawn. Most seriously, the government’s
early and strong support for SDI played directly into the opposition’s
hands, and may prove in the end to have preempted the chance for
a comprehensive, nonpartisan, and effective national defense debate.
Given the divisions among the Tories, public attitudes, and
Mulroney’s, apparent abhorrence of any controversy that might hurt
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Conservative political fortunes, we believe Ottawa is likely to decide
to place a clear emphasis on Canada’s NATO contribution—largely
because it appears to be the safest course politically. The Canadian
public supports NATO almost unanimously—when polls showed a
majority of Canadians opposed to the testing of US cruise missiles in
1983, for example, they also showed more than 85-percent supported
Canada’s membership in the Alliance—and the Liberal Party and
most of the media are staunchly pro-NATO; only the NDP advocates
Canadian withdrawal from NATO and this position consistently limits
its popularity. Moreover, if the Tories propose maintaining 3-percent
real growth in defense spending at a time of overall budget cutting—
indeed a period of reductions in social programs—a pro-NATO policy
probably would minimize public and media criticism and limit the
opposition’s ability to score points against the government.

the bureaucracy: a decidedly pro-nato influence on
the tories
The Department of External Affairs (DEA) has long regarded the
Canadian Forces’s [sic] role in NATO—particularly its assignment
in West Germany—as an essential condition for Ottawa to have
political weight in the Alliance. The hoary chestnut that a military
contribution “keeps Canada’s seat at the NATO table” is not an
inaccurate synopsis of this attitude. Throughout Trudeau’s years,
therefore, it tried to insure [sic] that the largest portion of the sparse
resources allocated to defense went for NATO commitments, even
though such a course meant that the defense tasks which the Prime
Minister designated as higher priorities—e.g., sovereignty protection
and continental defense—were underfunded or not funded. We
believe this attitude continues to hold the field in the Department
under the Tories. At a recent conference on Canada-US security, for
example, several senior External Affairs officials indicated that they
favored Canada seeking release from its commitment to NATO’s
northern flank—that is, the Canadian Air and Sea Transportable
(CAST) Brigade’s duties in Norway—and boosting Canadian ground
forces in West Germany to their pre-1971 strength. Moreover,
External Affairs Minister Clark is committed to improving Canada’s
political influence in the Alliance, and we believe that he supports
his Department’s position favoring a greater military contribution to
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NATO. This does not, however, insure [sic] that Clark would favor a
greater ground force commitment in Europe since it would provide
few of the domestic economic and political benefits that he and other
Tories, with an eye toward the election due in 1988, are seeking. In
our opinion, Clark and the DEA bureaucrats will produce nearly
irresistable [sic] pressure within Tory councils for a defense policy
emphasizing the NATO commitment.
The Department of National Defense (DND) was in political
eclipse throughout the Trudeau era, and was usually headed by
rather nondescript ministers. In the Cabinet, the Defense Department
wielded virtually no influence, and the Defense Minister seldom
sat on the Priorities and Planning Committee (PPC), the most
important Cabinet committee. Although Defense ostensibly has been
refurbished under the Tories and Nielsen now sits on the PPC, we
believe that the DND will have minimal influence on the formulation
of the Conservatives’ defense policy. The Green Paper/White Paper
process the Tories had promised for defense appears now to have been
folded into and replaced by the Green Paper being prepared by Clark
and External Affairs. Because Mulroney and Clark are primarily
concerned with the foreign policy implications of defense policy—and
because Nielsen has a full plate of domestic issues to focus on for
the immediate future—the Defense Department will have little to
say regarding what tasks are assigned to it. Moreover, because it
is enjoying a degree of political prominence and media attention—
if not influence—which it has not had in more than 20 years, we
believe that the senior Defense bureaucracy would be loathe to risk
that prominence by pushing for policies conflicting with the wishes
of Mulroney and Clark. In our opinion, although Defense probably
would be much more willing to accommodate a redefinition of defense
tasks than External Affairs, it probably will not actively pursue them
in the near or medium terms, and will be content with the political
necessity of stressing the NATO role.
The influence of Finance Minister Michael Wilson’s budget on
23 May may render conflicting intra-government views on defense
policy academic. Wilson currently is battling within the Cabinet for
a budget that would begin reducing Canada’s deficit. If he wins—as
now seems likely—the defense estimates probably will meet but not
exceed Canada’s commitment to 3-percent real growth in defense
spending. (Although Ottawa consistently has met the 3-percent goal
in recent years, we do not believe, given the CF’s overall deterioration
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during Trudeau’s tenure, that this rate of increase will arrest the
erosion of the CF’s capabilities.) In such a case, the already existing
NATO-centric orientation of Canadian defense spending probably
will continue, with Ottawa maintaining such large-scale capital
expenditures as the Canadian Frigate Program and the North
Warning System. We believe that if Wilson has his way with the
budget, Canada’s defense debate will come to an abrupt end and
the focus of defense spending will remain on NATO. In our opinion,
however, this does not foreclose the possibility of Ottawa being
receptive to suggestions for some redefinition and curtailment of its
current slate of NATO tasks.

future canadian defense policy: some preliminary
conclusions and estimates
The present state of the debate on Canadian defense policy is, to
say the least, confused and contradictory. Despite this unsettled
situation, we offer the following preliminary conclusions:
–– Mulroney, his party, and his government are sincerely committed
to revitalizing Canada’s defense effort, and particuarly [sic] its
NATO component. Two decades of Liberal neglect and an acute
budgetary crisis, however, will limit their ability to make rapid
substantive improvements. In our opinion, Tory defense policy
at least for the next several years will be long on rhetoric and
short on substance.
–– Mulroney’s government to date is decidedly timid about
measures that might disturb its current lofty standing in the
polls. Part of this timidity is due to the Tories’ lack of the
governing experience. We believe, however, that the greater part
is rooted in Mulroney’s overriding ambition to make the Tories
into a political machine capable of duplicating the Liberals’
political longevity—the Liberals have ruled Canada for 64 years
in this century—and his belief that opinion polls will guide him
toward that goal along the path of least resistance. Because polls
show that Canadian participation in NATO is almost universally
popular, we believe that Mulroney will eventually steer Canadian
defense policy toward an enhanced Alliance commitment.
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–– Within the NATO context, Ottawa probably will be willing—
perhaps eager—to consider any suggestions by the Alliance
that the list of Canada’s tasks be reconfigured and shortened
to match more closely its desires and available resources. We
believe that the Tories would find particularly appealing any
changes that might serve the threefold purpose of increasing
Canada’s credibility in NATO, bringing the country domestic
economic benefits, and allowing the Conservatives to fulfill a
campaign promise. A few examples of the type of adjustments
that Ottawa might favor include the following.
1. An increased maritime commitment requiring the construction of
additional frigates, which would, in turn, give business to shipyards
in Quebec and the Atlantic provinces where the Conservatives need
to strengthen their political base.
2. An increased ground force commitment in West Germany, with
a simultaneous redeployment of Canadian fighter squadrons to
Canada. Such a plan would:
₋₋

Allow the Tories to benefit politically from the public and media
approval that probably would greet such a decision.

–– The redeployment of CF-18s would provide a much-needed
economic boost to the communities surrounding several nowwithering or dormant air bases in Canada.
–– The restationed squadrons would allow the government to
ease some of the opposition’s pressure by claiming that it was
providing for the defense of Canada by Canadians, and thereby
lessening the country’s reliance on the US military.
–– Such moves probably would satisfy all levels of the bureaucracy
in Ottawa: External Affairs would be satisified [sic] with the
continued NATO commitment; Defense would take pleasure in
its improved military capabilities in Europe, in North America,
and in the public’s eye; and the Finance Ministry would perhaps
be pleased with a more rational expenditure of defense resources.
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3. Ottawa might be receptive to an increased “northern”
commitment—perhaps in conjunction with Norway, Iceland, and
the United Kingdom. Although we believe the DEA would initially
oppose the adoption of a greater CAST-type commitment, it probably
could not block a greater northern orientation for Canadian defense
policy if it was clearly recognized as part of Ottawa’s contribution
to NATO.
–– A northern commitment probably would require increased
maritime forces for Canada and would thereby bring some
domestic economic benefits with it. It might also involve greater
airborne surveillance responsibilities which would be a boon for
the communities surrounding air bases in the coastal provinces
and Arctic territories.
–– A northern commitment would be a politically marketable
commodity in that the media, a number of MPs from all three
major political parties, and the Senate Committee on External
Affairs and National Defense are expressing increasing concern
with Canada’s inability to defend its Arctic region. In addition,
a pride in being a “northern country” has long been part of
Canada’s national ethos, and plans for improving the country’s
Artic [sic] defense and/or surveillance capabilities almost
certainly would strike a responsive chord with most Canadians.
◆

◆

◆

◆
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